The National Industrial Security Program, or NISP, is the nominal authority (in the United States). Personnel Security Investigations for Industry and the National Industrial Security Program. This tables of contents is a navigational tool. Secrecy has increasingly become a tool for. National Industrial Security Program has been accepted by. National Technical Information Service document. Federal Register. National Industrial Security Program. Department of Defense (Do. D). Interim final rule. This Do. D interim final rule (rule) assigns responsibilities and establishes requirements related to the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) to ensure maximum uniformity and effectiveness for both Do. D and non- Do. D Components, as defined in this rule, for which the Department serves as the Cognizant Security Agency (CSA) and provides industrial security services in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 1. National Industrial Security Program.” The rule provides guidance on the procedures used to ensure classified information will be properly safeguarded if a contractor has reported foreign ownership, control or Start Printed Page 1. FOCI) information which Do. D must evaluate, mitigate, or negate as appropriate. The rule also provides guidance for the evaluation, mitigation, and/or negation of FOCI information reported by a company, as defined in the rule, which is in process for a facility security clearance (FCL). Effective Date: This rule is effective April 9, 2. Comments must be received by June 9, 2. You may submit comments, identified by 3. CFR part 1. 17, Docket No. Do. D- 2. 01. 1- OS- 0. Regulatory Information Number (RIN) 0. AI7. 1 by any of the following methods: Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name and docket number or RIN for this Federal Register document. The general policy for comments and other submissions from members of the public is to make these submissions available for public viewing on the Internet at http: //www. Valerie Heil, (7. The purpose of this part 1.
C is to set forth industrial security procedures and practices related to FOCI for the Components to ensure maximum uniformity and effectiveness in the Do. D implementation of E. O. 1. 28. 29. In accordance with the authority in Do. D Directive (Do. DD) 5. E. O. 1. 28. 29, Do. D Instruction (Do. DI) 5. 22. 0. 2. 2, and E. O. 1. 08. 65, “Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry,” for the protection of classified information that is disclosed to, or developed by contractors. This rule provides NISP policy to the Components and establishes procedures concerning the initial FCL eligibility of U. S. This rule does not levy requirements on U. S. These arrangements require trustees, proxy holders or outside directors to oversee and provide business management of the U. S. The average number of outside directors for a SCA is two. For CY1. 1, 1. 6 contractors were subject to a SSA, of which 1. SECRET information and four required access to TS information. The average number of outside directors for a SSA is three. In CY 1. 1, there were no VTAs and nine PAs that required access to TS information. The average number of proxy holders for a PA is three. The proxy holders, voting trustees, or outside directors must be eligible for access at the level of the FCL. CY 1. 1 total estimated costs for personnel security investigations of trustees, proxy holders and outside director are as follows: (1) The unit cost for a SECRET clearance (National Agency Check with Law and Credit NACLC) is $2. The unit cost for a TS (Single Scope Background Investigation—SSBI) is $4,0. Therefore, the total estimated investigation cost for outside directors and proxy holders under SCAs, SSAs and PAs for CY 1. These costs are government costs and not levied on contractors. FOCI measures provide protection from unauthorized transfer of classified information to foreign interests, thus saving billions of dollars. At the same time, the procedures in this rule allow companies determined to be under FOCI to be cleared through a FOCI mitigation or negation agreement and thus realize billions of dollars in classified contracts. By maintaining the capability for foreign- owned U. S. Non- Do. D Components issuing contracts requiring access to classified information who are not one of the four designated NISP CSAs (i. Department of Energy, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Do. D) must enter into agreements with DOD to establish the terms of oversight on their behalf. Currently, the procedures for assessing initial FCL eligibility for U. S. Currently, Do. D does not have uniform procedures to assess the risks and the potential adverse impact on the performance of contracts requiring access to classified information due to any FOCI information reported by U. S. The rule will provide uniform and effective procedures for Do. D to assess the risks associated with reports of material changes to FOCI information which are submitted annually by U. S. The rule also prescribes responsibilities for FOCI matters, to include assessment of risks which may result from a contractor's FOCI information. Finally, it outlines security measures Do. D may consider, implement, and oversee to mitigate or negate the effects of FOCI to an acceptable level for classified contract performance. The addition of this rule is part of Do. D's retrospective plan, completed in August 2. Executive Order 1. Improving Regulation and Start Printed Page 1. Regulatory Review.” Executive Order 1. Do. D's full plan and updates can be accessed at: http: //exchange. There is such an increased probability of unauthorized disclosure of classified information because the owner of a U. S. If there are no procedures as set forth in this rule to evaluate and determine how to negate or mitigate the foreign ownership, there will be nothing to prevent unauthorized disclosures of classified information since the foreign owner will have unfettered control of the U. S. This proposed rule provides the baseline requirements for the USG to evaluate the foreign owner's rights and determine whether those rights can be mitigated to effectively protect classified information and preclude its unauthorized disclosure. Depending upon what a foreign- owned U. S. Also, without this rule, Components will not have the ability to consider innovative technologies developed by foreign- owned U. S. Finally, the lack of a formal, uniform process has created significant delay in the completion of National Interest Determinations (NIDs) for foreign- owned U. S. These delays increase the costs to Components by preventing contract performance when access to classified information is required. This rule provides a baseline for protection of classified information through analysis, evaluation and, if needed, protective measures to mitigate or FOCI information at U. S. Government Contracting Activities (GCAs) don't know if there are risks, such as foreign ownership or control of a U. S. The uniform procedures in this rule provide the GCAs with analysis of potential adverse impact and mitigation or negation of FOCI information to allow foreign- owned U. S. Do. D and non- Do. D Components face an increased probability of the loss or compromise of classified information and subsequent harm to the national security, as a result of the award of classified contracts to foreign- owned U. S. 6. 01) because it would not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. It has been certified that 3. CFR part 1. 17 does not impose additional reporting or recordkeeping requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1. Standard Form (SF) 3. Certificate Pertaining to Foreign Interests” has been assigned OMB Control Number 0. It has been certified that 3. CFR part 1. 17 does not have federalism implications, as set forth in E. O. This rule does not have substantial direct effects on: (3) The distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of Government. Executive Order (E. O.) 1. 28. 29, January 6, 1. FR 3. 47. 9. Purpose. This part sets forth industrial security procedures and practices related to Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence (FOCI) for the Department of Defense (Do. D) Components, as defined in this part and non- Do. D Components, as defined in this part, to ensure maximum uniformity and effectiveness in Do. D implementation of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) established by Executive Order (E. O.) 1. 28. 29 “National Industrial Security Program,” (available at http: //www. When the term Government Contracting Activities (GCAs) is used, it applies to both Do. D Components and non- Do. D Components.(b) This part does not: (1) Limit in any manner the authority of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force; or the Heads of the Components, as defined in this part, to grant access to classified information under the cognizance of their respective department or agency to any individual or entity designated by them. The granting of such access is outside the scope of the NISP and is governed by Executive Order (E. O.) 1. 35. 26, “Classified National Security Information,” (available at http: //www. As defined in Do. D 5. 22. 0. 2. 2- M. Affiliate. As defined in Do. D 5. 22. 0. 2. 2- M. Board resolution. A formal, written decision of a company's board of directors, used to draw attention to a single act or board decision, e. Carve- out. As defined in Do. D Directive 5. 20. Special Access Program (SAP) Policy,” (available at http: //www. As defined in Do. D 5. 22. 0. 2. 2- M. Classified information. As defined in Joint Publication 1- 0. Do. D Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” (available at http: //www. As defined in Do. D 5. 22. 0. 2. 2- M. Components. Do. D Components and non- Do. D Components for which Do. D provides industrial security services in accordance with E. O. As defined in Joint Publication 6- 0, “Joint Communication System” (available at http: //www. As defined in Do. D 5. 22. 0. 2. 2- M. Counterintelligence. As defined in Joint Publication 1- 0. Covered transaction. As defined in Do. D Instruction 2. 00. Do. D Procedures for Reviewing and Monitoring Transactions Filed with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)”. As defined in Do. D 5. 22. 0. 2. 2- M. Defense articles. As defined in Do. D 5. 22. 0. 2. 2- M.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. Archives
December 2016
Categories |